

THE NEW NDA GOVERNMENT AND SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS : EXPECTATIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES*

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While it has been two years since the new National Democratic Alliance (NDA) has been in power and hence a holistic assessment cannot be reached for this short span, some expectations can be charted out on the foreign policy front in general and on China in particular. Since May 2014, after the new NDA government was formed a number of foreign policy initiatives have been undertaken with some on China as well. Structurally while the India-China relations were conditioned by the last several decades of interactions and issues such as the unresolved territorial dispute, Tibet, China's nuclear and conventional arms support to Indian neighbourhood and entry into the Indian Ocean, the new leaders in both countries have tried to take several initiatives to go beyond the constraints. Even though much progress has been achieved specifically in high level leadership exchanges, trade and economic cooperation, people-to-people contacts and the like, a number of uncertainties have also crept in the bilateral relations.

Elections and after

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his government which came to power in May 2014 have identified a few broad areas as focus of its foreign policy. These have some implications for the India-China relations as well. Firstly, it is the election campaign promise of “*vikas*” (development) in the backdrop of declining growth rates and recession. As a result, the new government stressed “Make in India” policy of expanding the manufacturing sector, which could enhance the employment figures. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in its election manifesto and the President's address to the Joint Session of the Parliament on June 9, 2014 –all have outlined these. The foreign policy implication of this aspect is to re-calibrate for the domestic agenda, i.e., stress on economic diplomacy and gear up the establishment towards attracting investments, expanding trade, enter into multilateral institutions aimed at economic issues (like the BRICS New Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and others). PM Modi gave an interview to the China-state run CCTV two days before the May, 2015 visit to China stating his objectives: that he is looking “forward to working out a roadmap for qualitatively upgrading our economic relations and seek greater Chinese participation in India's economic growth, especially in transforming India's manufacturing sector and infrastructure”. The agreements in China indicated to the direction of economic development - the business deals are

worth \$10 billion signed at Beijing and \$22 billion at Shanghai, in addition to \$20 billion announced by President Xi Jinping in 2014 for the next five years.

Secondly, the new government promised to protect sovereignty and territorial integrity issues affecting the country. Candidate Modi speaking at Pasighat in February, 2014 criticized the “expansionist mindset” of China [in its claims on Arunachal Pradesh] and the futility of such postures in the 21st century. After becoming the PM, Modi not only repeated the same phrase of “expansionism” in his Japan sojourn but also made efforts at raising the Strike Corps meant to protect borders with China. During the visit of President Xi Jinping to Delhi in September, 2014 – overshadowed by the Chumar build-up of an estimated 1,000 Chinese military troops - Modi stated in his media interaction to the conditional normalization of relations with China thus: “a climate of mutual trust and confidence; respect for each other’s sensitivities and concerns; and peace and stability in our relations and along our borders are essential for us to realize the enormous potential in our relations.”¹ Another instance is the terrorism issue which has been configured as the number one security challenge for both India and China. The Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi’s and Masood Azhar’s cases and Beijing’s position in this regard at the United Nations Security Council meetings on counter-terrorism became a contentious issue. In November, 2015, Indian Home Minister, Rajnath Singh visited Beijing and concluded agreements on counter-terrorism.² 2015 also witnessed the 5th Hand-in-Hand joint training programme between the two armies at Kunming in October with the participation of 144 troops from each side.³ Nevertheless, the unrelenting position of China on its “procedural” and “technical hold” on five cases of Pakistan-based terrorists wanted by the Indian side, has left a bad taste in India. Indian unhappiness about the above cases also coincided with the e-visa issuance initially to Uighur activists like Dolkun Isa and later their cancellation – suggesting that not only the Tibet issue but also the Uighur issue has come to the fore in the India-China relations in the recent times.

Another inter-related feature is the infrastructure projects connecting borders. The BJP manifesto and the presidential address suggested to building world-class infrastructure, including the “expansion of railways in hilly states and North-east region.”⁴ This is following China’s recent initiatives on dual-use infrastructure projects in Tibet coinciding as well with the elevation of the Tibet Military Command in the Chinese military hierarchy and missions.⁵ India intends to construct 14 railway lines and 73 roadways (3,812 km) along its borders with China and Pakistan. These will be built according to the Minister of State for Defence, Rao Inderjit Singh by 2018.

According to the Ministry of Development for the North-east Region report, the following are the projects being undertaken as a part of the road construction activity on the India-China border areas:

- Arunachal Pradesh – 27 roads, Sikkim- 6 roads.
- ITBP is constructing 8 stretches in Arunachal Pradesh (5 roads -271.04 km) and Sikkim (3 roads – 103 km). Work is ongoing with 5 roads almost being completed upto 60%.
- BRO is constructing 15 stretches in Arunachal Pradesh (13 roads -1326.77 km) and Sikkim (2 roads – 47.28 km). Probable year of completion - 2016.
- BRO has completed 10 stretches in Arunachal Pradesh.

Of the 73 roads, 61 are being handled by the Border Roads Organisation and 12 by Central Public Works Department. Out of the 61 roads, 27 are to be constructed in Arunachal Pradesh, 12 in J&K, 14 in Uttrakhand, 5 in Himachal Pradesh and 3 in Sikkim. 17 of these roads were completed by late 2013.

In October 2014, India began a survey of constructing over 1350 km of railway lines across the borders with China. The proposed line includes the following:

- Misamari-Tawang Railway line 378 kms
- Assam-Arunachal Pradesh, north Lakhimpur- Silapthar line 248 kms
- Assam-Arunachal Pradesh, Murkongselek-Pasighat-Tezu-Parshuram Kund-Rupai Siding line 256 kms
- Himachal Pradesh-Jammu and Kashmir, Bilaspur-Mandi-Manali-Leh 498 kms

By July 31, 2015, the Railway Ministry announced “final local survey” of the above projects. The Defence Ministry, in the light of the difficulties expressed by the Railway Ministry, is likely to fund the railway construction projects worth an initial estimate of Rs 1.4 lakh crores.

Thirdly, the NDA government identified the Indian neighbourhood as its foreign policy priority. It was reflected in the invitation to the South Asian neighbours to Prime Minister Modi’s swearing-in ceremony, and in his choice of Thimphu for his maiden foreign visit. The presidential address also identified China, Japan, Russia, the US and the EU; but it is clear that India’s relation with the US and Japan is poised to be on the upswing. Specifically on China, the address, while reiterating the “strategic and cooperative partnership” agreement of 2005, stated that the new government “will engage energetically” with Beijing. The new Prime Minister had made 40 visits abroad in two years. The focus of these is the neighbourhood and also conveying messages to the “extra regional” powers to acknowledge the Indian position. Prime Minister Modi told the press after the talks with China’s Premier Li Keqiang in May, 2015 visit to China, “I stressed the need for China to reconsider its approach on some of the issues that hold us back from realizing full potential of our partnership”. Modi was referring to the perennial problems in the bilateral relations, viz., continuing cooperation between China and Pakistan specifically in Pakistan occupied Kashmir⁶, the unresolved territorial dispute and others.

A number of events took place in 2014-16 between India and China. These include the 18th Special Representative meeting between NSA Shiv Shankar Menon and State Councillor Dai Bingguo in January, the 5th Strategic Dialogue between the two foreign ministries at the Foreign Secretary level (in August, 2013), the 3rd Strategic Economic Dialogue in March, the visit of Foreign Minister Wang Yi to New Delhi on June 8-9 as “special envoy” of the President, Vice President Hamid Ansari (accompanied by Minister of State for Commerce Nirmala Sitaraman) in late June (the first such visit since 1994) and later Army Chief Bikram Singh to Beijing from July 1-6. Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping met at Fortaleza at the sidelines of the BRICS meeting in July. 2014 has been christened as the Year of Friendly Exchanges; both countries also planned to organise a cultural event, the “Glimpse of India” and to promote Chinese language, launched the “Chinese Bridge” language competition and compiled an “Encyclopaedia of China-India Cultural Contacts”. 2015 has been designated as Visit India Year while 2016 as Visit China Year for promoting people-to-people contacts.⁷ To cap these events in 2014, President Xi Jinping visited India in September – the third such visit ever by a Chinese President after Jiang Zemin’s 1996 and Hu Jintao’s 2006 visits⁸.

Modi-Xi met several times so far with the significant ones being:

- Fortaleza meeting of the BRICS in July 2014
- September 2014 Xi’s visit to India
- G-20 meeting in Australia
- Modi’s visit to Xian-Beijing May, 2015 – “two major powers in the region and the world”
- Ufa meetings of BRICS and SCO in July, 2015

Subsequently, Prime Minister Modi visited China in mid-2015⁹. He signed 24 agreements with Premier Li Keqiang that range from outer space cooperation to civil nuclear cooperation, from sister-city cooperation to an additional consulate, from skill development to expanding educational exchange programmes, from broadcasting to tourism, from a new leaders’ forum at the provincial level to yoga colleges¹⁰.

Then came in quick succession Vice President Li Yuanchao’s visit to Delhi in November, 2015, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission Gen. Fan Chanlong’s visit in late 2015, followed by Defence Minister Parikkar’s visit to Beijing in April, 2016¹¹. There was also the 19th Special Representative meeting held at Beijing by the visit of NSA Ajit Doval¹² and the interactions between Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj with her counterparts in Russia and China for the trilateral meeting. Earlier Swaraj visited Beijing, for the same trilateral meeting in January-February, 2015 where she mentioned about a possible ‘out of the box solution’ to the territorial dispute and ‘synergy-based cooperation’ on the Chinese Silk Road projects. She had also conditionally accepted

the Bangladesh-India-China-Myanmar Economic corridor which was mentioned in Modi-Xi statement in September, 2014 provided it ensures “peaceful, stable and cooperative environment.”

Despite these signals of the “three consensus” on border stability, economic cooperation and people-to-people contacts, it is also not lost on either side that their objectives and actions could go tangentially opposite to the bilateral ties. The cases are President Xi Jinping’s controversial announcement of \$46 billion in Islamabad in April, 2015 for infrastructure projects passing through the disputed Kashmir region. Also, Modi’s new government which invited SAARC leaders for the inaugural function included Tibetan Parliament-in Exile Lobsang Sangay among the invitees¹³.

Modi’s neighbourhood policy is also seen as strengthening India’s position in the neighbourhood of South-Asia and the Indian Ocean region. Modi’s visits to Thimpu and Kathmandu; later to Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, to Indian Ocean (Seychelles, Mauritius), to Naypyidaw for the East Asian Summit and long-term arrangements with Bangladesh (land and islands settlements) have all contributed to improvement in relations where China has been making inroads recently.

In the meanwhile two significant events happened that could influence the long-term Indian foreign policy. On July 20, 2015 Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar delivered the IISS Fullerton Lecture in Singapore. He stated that India’s “foreign policy dimension is to aspire to be a leading power, rather than just a balancing power”. Later, NSA Ajit Doval who stated in Beijing in 2014 for an “orbital jump” in bilateral relations, spoke on August 3, 2015 at Mumbai, that India “should not punch below our weight or over our weight. We must punch proportionately”. While the reflections of this policy are not clearly visible, except in the climate change deal at Paris, where India committed for solar energy initiative with France and the Indian Army is chasing terrorists in hot pursuit inside Myanmar, a new resolve in the Indian establishment is evident recently.

Coinciding with the above, the envelope of India in Modi’s government seems to be expanding. India has an “extended neighbourhood” with Central Asia, “digital neighbourhood” with the United States, Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Mongolia yielded “spiritual neighbourhood” with this country. India’s “Act East Asia” policy – outlined during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the United States in September, 2014 and firmed up during President Obama’s visit to India in January, 2015; it gained traction with the Prime Minister Modi’s visits abroad including Tokyo in August-September, 2014, Myanmar in November during the East Asian Summit meeting, Australia for the G-20 meeting and the tri-nation visit to China and Mongolia and South Korea in May-June, 2015. While traditionally, the 1991 onwards “Look East Asia” policy covered China, Japan, South Korea and South-East Asia, Mongolia has now been mentioned (during

Prime Minister Modi's visit to Ulan Bator) for the first time as a part of the ambit of this policy. Although the "teeth" of this policy – hard power, specifically in the naval domain - is yet to be explicitly exhibited, the diplomatic initiatives during this visit should be able to cushion the subsequent thrusts. With 55 percent of Indian trade today passing through these regions, India is expected to unveil its military dimension as well¹⁴. Significantly, during the visit of Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to New Delhi in December, 2015, both agreed to enhance maritime cooperation, including Japan joining the US-India Malabar exercises "permanently".¹⁵

The civil nuclear dimension is becoming prominent in the Indian foreign policy recently. After the recent civil nuclear agreement with Sri Lanka, where India plans to train Sri Lankan scientists in various peaceful uses of nuclear programme, India on the one hand got explicit support from Seoul and implicit nod from Beijing to the membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group that is crucial in securing civilian nuclear materials and technologies. On the other hand, India had signed an agreement with Mongolia to establish a nuclear centre for health aspects. Mongolia had also before signed agreements for supply of uranium to India. In the joint statement issued with Premier Li Keqiang, one prominent missing point is the NSG membership for India, although China "took note of India's aspirations to become a member of the NSG".

Economic issues

On the economic front, if "vikas" is a major electoral plank of the new government, much is expected in this direction. In 2015, India grew at an estimated 7.2 percent, overshadowing the Chinese "new normal" economic growth rate of 6.9 percent, although India has to maintain such growth rates for the next two to three decades if it has to catch up with China. Most of the new Prime Minister's visits abroad are to raise foreign direct investments in the country. Skill India, Make in India, Sagarmala, infrastructure projects including the Chabahar port investments in Iran are all seen in expanding the economic profile of India¹⁶.

China's connection in this seems to be marginal despite the announcements of reaching a bilateral trade volume of \$100 billion target by 2015 (it reached about \$72 billion in 2015) and investments in manufacturing zones and infrastructure projects. While the trade deficit since 2007 till 2015 amounted to more than \$200 billion, China's investments have not been able to reach more than \$3.2 billion by this period¹⁷.

Nevertheless, some initiatives are made by both the countries. India joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as number two investor, in addition to the New Development Bank of the BRICS¹⁸. Also, in January, 2016, the Reserve Bank of India opened inter-bank foreign exchange market in China (opened for 13 more since November, 2015)¹⁹. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, proposed in 2013, finally took off

in January, 2016. Fifty Seven countries are part of this bank meant to finance infrastructure projects with an initial outlay of \$100 billion. According to the Articles of Agreement, China, India and Russia are largest stakeholders with a 30.34 per cent, 8.52 per cent, 6.66 per cent stake, respectively. Their voting shares are calculated at 26.06 per cent, 7.5 per cent and 5.92 percent.²⁰

Expectations & Uncertainties

The above brief analyses of the new government's policies and its relations with China suggest that the expectations and realities have not been completely matched, specifically as several uncertainties have begun to creep in recently. Foremost, as two "simultaneous rising" countries in Asia, China and India have several expectations. Both intend to rise peacefully with the expectation that the bilateral relations are conducted peacefully and the borders remain stable and peaceful. However, despite the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement of 2013, reiterated during Parikkar's visit to Beijing in April, 2016, border domination efforts of China and periodic border transgressions have upset New Delhi's calculations. While last one year saw decrease in investments in the Strike Corps (to be based at Panagarh), it is expected that the Indian armed forces, despite the confidence building measures with China, are likely to increase investments in maintaining conventional and strategic deterrence.

Secondly, on the economic front, mounting trade deficits are leading to calls on the Indian front to take recourse to corrective measures such as anti-dumping duties against Chinese goods, security curbs on Chinese firms, in addition to insisting on market mechanism implementation by China²¹.

Thirdly, at the larger landscape in Asia and beyond, strategic uncertainties loom large for India. China's recent initiatives on the Silk Road and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and others make it clear that today the country is knocking at the gates of international levers of power. This is a signal that the current leadership in China is moving away from Deng Xiaoping's dictum of "*taoguang yanghui*" [keeping a low profile] to exhibiting capabilities. China realizes that it is facing "increasing external impediments and challenges" – as the May, 2015 White Paper on China's Military Strategy argued - and yet it wants to expand its global and regional imprint. The white paper is unequivocal on this count. It orders that "the armed forces will ...effectively secure China's overseas interests." The armed forces will "safeguard China's security and interests in new domains" and "maintain regional and world peace". With more than half of the economy of China now dependent on exports and imports mainly coming from the seas, the naval forces are now ordered to "protect the security of strategic SLOCs and overseas interests". Not only will the country's navy operate expeditionary forces henceforth but it will also contribute to the maritime might of the country. China's two ocean strategy – in the

Pacific and the Indian Oceans²² – forward bases in South China Sea, Arabian Sea and in the Gulf of Aden will provide the navy with power projection in addition to the hardware it is acquiring recently. After 22 naval contingents sent to the Gulf of Aden since 2008, and successful evacuation of Chinese national from war-torn Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen recently, China today feels confident in “open seas protection” in the Indian Ocean region as well.

Overall, while the new NDA government came into being with development as the electoral plank and was partially successful in increasing growth rates, the foreign policy dimension of this aspect is still to be configured due to several uncertainties as the unresolved territorial dispute with China, its growing influence in the South Asian and the Indian Ocean region and the like. Despite several visits and arrangements, a number of problems beset India’s relations with China.

Notes

- ¹ In April 15-May, 2013 nearly 200 Chinese military patrols intruded 19 kilometers inside the Indian territory in the western sector at Dapsang Plains. Subsequently, in September, 2014, coinciding with President Xi Jinping’s visit was the Chumar incident of over 1000 troops buildup. This was followed again by such incidents in the same area in September and November, 2015. During the visit of Vice Chairman of Central Military Commission of the PLA in November, 2015, Gen Fan Changlong suggested that at all levels confidence building measures be undertaken. See “China-India border remains stable: official” *People’s Daily* November, 17, 2015 at <<http://en.people.cn/n/2015/1117/c90000-8977724.html>>
- ² “China, India to step up counter-terrorism cooperation” *People’s Daily* November 22, 2015 at <<http://en.people.cn/n/2015/1122/c90000-8980072.html>>
- ³ “China-India joint anti-terrorism training” *People’s Daily* November, 2015 at <<http://en.people.cn/n/2015/1026/c98649-8966931.html>>
- ⁴ China had recently completed a 258 km rail line from Lhasa to Xigaze in August, 2014 at an estimated cost of \$2.1 billion and plans to build another 435 km line from Lhasa to Nyingqi prefecture that is north of Arunachal Pradesh at a cost of about \$5 billion. The Lhasa to Nyingqi route is closer to the Indian borders. In December, 2014, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on a visit to Nepal, signed a bilateral agreement for extending the railway line from Xigaze to the Nepalese borders. Later, Ji Guogang, director of Tibet’s Development and Reform Commission, stated that as a part of the 13th Five Year Plan proposals the railway line (of about 253 km) from Xigaze will be extended to Gyirong (35 km from Resuowa in Nepal) and Yadong (near Sikkim).
- ⁵ See Kou Jie “China raises Tibet Military Command’s power rank” *The Global Times*, May 13, 2016 at <<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/982843.shtml>>
- ⁶ See on China’s troops presence in the region, Yao Xinyu, “Purely fictitious! Indian media claims Chinese troops will soon be deployed in Pakistan” *People’s Daily* March 14, 2016 at <<http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0314/c98649-9029979.html>>
- ⁷ “Xi congratulates on launch of ‘Visit China Year in India’” *People’s Daily* January 17, 2016 at <<http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0117/c90000-9005035.html>>
- ⁸ See the joint statement of Xi-Modi “Joint Statement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Building a Closer Developmental Partnership” September 19, 2014 at <<http://en.people.cn/n3/2014/0919/c90000-8980072.html>>

mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24022/Joint_Statement_between_the_Republic_of_India_and_the_Peoples_Republic_of_China_on_Building_a_Closer_Developmental_Partnership>

- ⁹ See the joint statement between Modi and Li “Joint Statement between India and China during Prime Minister’s visit to China” May 15, 2015 at <http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25240/Joint_Statement_between_the_India_and_China_during_Prime_Ministers_visit_to_China>
- ¹⁰ One Yoga college was established at Kunming in November, 2015. See “China-India Yoga College opens in Kunming” *People’s Daily* November 15, 2015 at <<http://en.people.cn/n3/2015/1115/c90000-8976826.html>> and “China-India Yoga Conference held in Kunming” *People’s Daily* May 19, 2016 at <<http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0519/c90000-9060189.html>>
- ¹¹ Strengthening the October, 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement in maintaining border stability, hotlines between military operational commanders and others were part of this visit. See Chen Heying, “China, India mull military hotline” *The Global Times* April 19, 2016 at <<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/979108.shtml>>. Also, China’s navy for the first time participated in the International Fleet Review in February, 2016 at Visakhapatnam. See “Chinese Type 054A frigates attend India’s Int’l Fleet Review” *People’s Daily* February 5, 2016 at <<http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0205/c90000-9014563.html>>
- ¹² See “China, India have “extensive, deep, candid” talks on boundary issues” *People’s Daily* April 21, 2016 at <<http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0421/c90000-9047493.html>> and “Chinese premier underlines peaceful settlement of boundary issues with India” *People’s Daily* April 22, 2016 at <<http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0422/c90000-9048064.html>>
- ¹³ When Lobsang Sangay won once again as the Prime Minister in the 2016 elections, China denied any legitimacy associated with such elections. See “China denies legitimacy of ‘election’ by so-called Tibetan ‘government-in-exile’” *The Global Times* May 3, 2016 at <<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/981219.shtml>>
- ¹⁴ Sumantra Maitra “Indian footprints in the South China Sea” *People’s Daily* April 19, 2016 at <http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0419/c90883-9046433.html>. On the emerging equations in US-India relations see Shi Lancha, “India’s Sino-US hedging sticks to old balance” *The Global Times* April 28, 2016 at <<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/980650.shtml>>
- ¹⁵ Commenting on this, China’s foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei expressed reservations on Indo-Japan cooperation. See “China warns against provoking confrontation in the South China Sea” *People’s Daily* December 15, 2015 at <<http://en.people.cn/n3/2015/1215/c90000-8990745.html>>
- ¹⁶ “India to invest 20 bln USD to develop Iran’s Chabahar port” *The Global Times* April 11, 2016 at <<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/978013.shtml>>
- ¹⁷ One exception is that of the Wanda Group’s investment in the real estate sector. See “China’s Wanda to develop \$10b park in India” *People’s Daily* January 26, 2016 at <<http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0126/c90000-9009449.html>>
- ¹⁸ “China, BRICS New Development Bank sign documents on headquarters in Shanghai” *People’s Daily* February 28, 2016 at <<http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0228/c90785-9022402.html>>
- ¹⁹ “More foreign institutions allowed on China’s forex market” *People’s Daily* January 12, 2016 at <<http://en.people.cn/business/n3/2016/0112/c90778-9002639.html>>
- ²⁰ “AIIB formally established in Beijing” *People’s Daily* December 26, 2015 at <<http://en.people.cn/business/n3/2015/1226/c90778-8995831.html>>
- ²¹ Zhang Hui, “India will suffer if security checks on Chinese firms tighten: expert” *The Global Times* April 6, 2016 at <<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/977370.shtml>>

²² According to Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo China's role in the Indian Ocean is going to expand in the coming years. See Yuan Can, "China's presence in Indian Ocean legitimate, military expert says" *People's Daily* March 18, 2016 at <<http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0318/c90000-9032455.html>>

*This article is based on the speech delivered in the valedictory session of the International Conference on 'New regime under NDA Government and Sino-Indian Relation: Expectation and Uncertainty' held during August 12-13, 2015.

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